What Are We Reforming? Tort Theory\u27s Place in Debates Over Malpractice Reform by Goldberg, John C.P.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 4 Article 3 
5-2006 
What Are We Reforming? Tort Theory's Place in Debates Over 
Malpractice Reform 
John C.P. Goldberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John C.P. Goldberg, What Are We Reforming? Tort Theory's Place in Debates Over Malpractice Reform, 59 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1075 (2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol59/iss4/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
What Are We Reforming? Tort
Theory's Place In Debates over
Malpractice Reform
John C. P. Goldberg*
Those who are reforming medical malpractice law, or studying
its reform, ought to attend to tort theory. This is not because theory
will settle difficult policy debates. But it does enable reformers and
scholars to be more aware of how under-appreciated and possibly
dubious assumptions or inferences might be skewing their analyses.
In this Essay, I aim to make this point with two examples.
I
My first example concerns under-litigation-the apparent fact
that a substantial percentage of persons with injuries plausibly
traceable to malpractice never sue their doctors.' Assume this is a
real phenomenon. What are we to make of it? In the eyes of some, it
provides proof that the tort system is dysfunctional. After all, if only a
small percentage of malpractice victims sue, then there is likely to be
significant under-deterrence of bad medical practices and significant
under-compensation of injured patients. And, if the point of tort law
is-as courts and commentators commonly say-to deter and
compensate, it follows inexorably that we have a problem. 2
Enter theory. The preceding syllogism, of course, starts from
an initial condition: if the point of tort is to deter and compensate,
then .... Now some would say that this particular condition is
definitional or axiomatic: What else can tort law promise to deliver?
But this is a mistake. The claim that the purpose of tort law is to
deter and compensate is not an analytic truth. Rather it is shorthand
Associate Dean for Research and Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks
to the Roscoe Pound Institute for sponsoring this symposium, and to fellow participants for very
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Remaining errors are my own.
1. See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 37 (2005) (citing studies).
2. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1595, 1608, 1624-25 (1995).
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for a set of descriptive and normative claims that hang together and
carry certain entailments. In other words, deterrence and
compensation are watchwords for a particular theory of tort law. And,
as it turns out, the theory is not a particularly compelling one.
3
To posit that tort law is a system for deterring undesirable
conduct and compensating injury victims is, essentially, to think of
tort law as a branch of the administrative state. If you imagine a
legislature delegating its powers to regulate unsafe conduct and to
provide relief to victims of small-scale disasters to a newly created
agency called the Department of Safety and Relief, you will have a
general sense of the theory. It posits that, by doling out damage
awards predicated on misconduct and injury, judges and jurors in tort
cases perform the socially useful function of discouraging such conduct
in the future and providing relief to at least some injured persons.
So far so good, at least in terms of the internal coherence of the
theory. But problems quickly emerge. Interpretively, compensation-
and-deterrence theorists have trouble explaining basic features of tort
law, such as the requirement of proof of causation that applies to most
torts. If the point really is to deter undesirable conduct and
compensate the injured, why should the law care if this defendant's
misconduct caused this plaintiff's injury? If there has been
misconduct and injury, then, regardless of any causal relation between
them, a payment by defendant to plaintiff will deter and compensate.
4
Prescriptively, are we keen to have non-expert judges and juries
decide on a one-off basis what sort of conduct ought to be deterred and
which sorts of adverse consequences compensated? Wouldn't it be
better to develop safety rules through notice-and-comment rulemaking
and to design broad-based, low-transaction-cost compensation systems
that promise to achieve greater equity across cases?
5
Of course there is a lot more to be said in defense and criticism
of compensation-deterrence theory. Suppose I'm right, though, that it
faces a set of serious deficiencies. What would a more descriptively
complete and prescriptively plausible theory of tort look like? I've
elsewhere argued, along with Professor Zipursky, that tort is best
understood as a law for the redress of private wrongs. 6 Taking
3. For a survey of various criticisms of compensation-deterrence theory, see John C. P.
Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521-37 (2003).
4. Id. at 530-32.
5. Id. at 536-37. Compensation-deterrence theorists might respond: "Sure, but until we
have those, tort is better than nothing." Resort to second-best arguments of this sort is a sign of a
theory running into problems. This is particularly so when alternative theories are available that
do not have to rely on second-best notions to make sense of the subject being theorized.
6. See generally John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (articulating redress
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seriously tort's structure, vocabulary and 'grammar', 7 leads one to
grasp that the point of this body of law is to articulate duties of
conduct that individuals and entities owe to one another, and to
empower those injured by breaches of these duties (i.e., by wrongs) to
invoke the law to go after their wrongdoers. Tort law, in other words,
is best theorized as a special kind of victims' rights law. As such, it
promises to deliver various goods within our liberal-constitutional
system of government apart from deterrence and compensation, even
though it will sometimes deliver those as well. In particular, it
reinforces and refines norms of responsible conduct, helps sustain a
distinctively liberal notion of civil society, assures citizens that
government is committed to attend to their complaints on a more or
less individualized basis, and avoids excessive reliance on top-down
regulation."
Now let's consider what under-litigation looks like when
viewed through the lens of what I am claiming is better tort theory.
On a wrongs-and-redress view, tort law confers on victims of wrongs a
legal power to respond to those wrongs by suing, usually for damages.
Critically, that option belongs to the victim (or to a legal
representative of the victim)-it is hers alone to exercise. It follows
that one can infer nothing about the condition of the tort system from
the brute fact that a significant percentage of potential claimants are
declining to pursue claims. For if we were to learn that the persons
with colorable medical malpractice claims choose not to sue based on
an appropriately informed and voluntary decision, then there is
nothing wrong with how the tort system is operating in this area-it is
doing exactly what it is supposed to do. This is because, contrary to
compensation-and-deterrence theory, the tort system is not best
understood as arming victims with the power to sue in order to serve
theory and explaining its implication for constitutional challenges to tort reform legislation);
John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364
(2005) (criticizing Judge Calabresi's equation of tort law with accident law for failing to take
seriously the idea of tort as a law of wrongs); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) (explaining the differences between redress or
recourse theory and corrective justice theory); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs and
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998) (articulating the basic framework of
wrongs and recourse).
7. Here I have in mind such features as: the system of plaintiff-initiated suits; the fact
that suits are predicated on allegations of injury and wrongdoing; a focus on wrong and injury
both in substantive governing law and the fact-finding process; doctrinal requirements
demanding that the plaintiff establish not merely that the defendant has committed a "wrong in
the air" but a wrong as to her; redress that is provided at the demand of the claimant to the
claimant, and so forth.
8. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 606-11; see also BAKER, supra note 1, at 111-14 (arguing
that medical malpractice lawsuits promote traditional American values).
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public goals such as deterrence and compensation. Instead, it arms
victims because they are entitled to be so armed. They have a right to
pursue claims of redress, regardless (at least in the first instance) of
whether their doing so enhances deterrence, generates a reliable
system of compensation, offsets the political clout of the rich and
powerful, justly redistributes wealth, or otherwise redounds to the
public good.9
Needless to say, everything hinges on the reasons people are
refraining from suing, and here it will become important to sift
through considerations such as those identified in the excellent paper
by Professors Hyman and Silver.10 To the extent data on under-
litigation reflect "information asymmetries," then there really is a
problem.'1 A scheme designed to empower victims to pursue claims is
failing if the reason those claims are not being brought is that
wrongdoers are able to hide their wrongs, or that victims are ill-
informed about their rights or unable to locate a lawyer to represent
them. At the other end of the spectrum, if victims are not suing
because their injuries are relatively minor or transitory (e.g., a post-
operative infection that heals), or because they have adequate
financial security and do not see much point in seeking additional
dollars from their physician, or because they sincerely take the view
that mistakes happen, and thus are not inclined to hold even legally
at-fault persons accountable, then there is no cause for concern.
An intermediate case concerns the role that the burdens of
litigation may play in the decision to sue. Suppose some potential
claimants with valid claims do not sue because they are unprepared to
take on the burdens of hiring a lawyer and slogging through
potentially stressful or embarrassing discovery. Do these features of
the system suggest a problem? It depends. Tort law is not disaster
relief. It is a process for obtaining vindication. Given that this is
what it is about, lawmakers might reasonably (and usually do) place
on complainants the burden of proving that they have been wrongfully
injured and reasonably (and usually do) give the defendant a fair
opportunity to defend herself.1 2 Insofar as the transaction costs of
9. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 559-83 (discussing the recognition in American law of the
idea of a right to a law for the redress of wrongs).
10. See generally David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and
Tort Reform: It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (2006).
11. See id. at 22, 36 ("Under-claiming is difficult to fix because most of us cannot easily tell
whether we received proper care.").
12. Apparently this system works pretty well at deterring and filtering frivolous claims. See
BAKER, supra note 1, at 77-87 (discussing studies indicating that liability insurers do not tend to
pay substantial compensation to plaintiffs with weak claims, and that the vast majority of filed
1078 [Vol. 59:4:1075
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litigation are part and parcel of a system for fairly adjudicating claims
of wrong and injury, the fact that they deter certain victims from
pressing meritorious claims is not a ground for declaring the system
broken. By contrast, if the system grants defendants unjustified
opportunities to stonewall or to take advantage of their greater wealth
or repeat-player expertise, and that is contributing to under-claiming,
then the law may well be in need of reform.
I should be clear about what I am not saying here. Even if it
turns out that a significant percentage of the plaintiffs who do not sue
are refraining for the right reasons, it does not follow that government
needs to be content with the status quo. Instead, it might want to
encourage individuals to be more assertive about their rights. And
one valid reason for doing so might be a concern that so few people are
asserting their rights that doctors are not being deterred from
committing malpractice and victims are not being adequately
compensated. (To say the government might be justifiably concerned
about the systemic implications of whether individuals are or are not
availing themselves of their rights is not to say that those implications
capture the content of those rights or the purposes of recognizing
them.) Also, nothing in the foregoing suggests that, even apart from
the issue of under-litigation, government has no business designing
and implementing schemes for deterrence and compensation. That
governments have long provided a law for the redress of wrongs does
not mean that they cannot and should not provide other forms of law.
Perhaps state governments or the federal government ought to put in
place systems of regulation and compensation that operate apart from
the tort system, or schemes that foster conditions that will permit
market forces to generate incentives toward safety. These same
concerns might even justify a governmental decision to supplant the
operation of the tort system in a particular area in order to better
achieve one or both of these goals. But to allow for these possibilities
is, again, not to say that the tort system aims to deter and
compensate, nor that the phenomenon of under-litigation itself
establishes that the system is broken.
II
Here is a second way in which tort theory affects our analysis
of medical malpractice law. Suppose that, like compensation-




deterrence theorists, one conceives of tort law as "public law"-
regulatory law, social welfare law, or consumer protection law. It
would seem to follow that tort is the sort of law that merely adjusts
the "burdens and benefits of economic life."13 And, at least since 1937,
the Supreme Court has been sending a relatively clear message to
judges about what they are to do with suits challenging such laws for
violating constitutional rights, such as the federal rights to due
process of law and equal protection. They are supposed to toss them
out under the rational basis test. If a legislature wants to set up
malpractice review panels, or establish very short statutes of
limitations, or statutes of repose, or impose caps on damages for such
claims, they can do so as long as a court is later able to reverse-
engineer a legislative policy rationale for the measures in question.
And the latter is hardly a difficult task, at least as applied to
defendant-friendly tort reform measures. For any such measure, a
court can readily construct a salutary goal that legislators might have
had in mind. (In the area of malpractice, for example, legislators can
surely be supposed to have sought to make medical services more
affordable or available.) Thus, in this view of tort, a court should
uphold as rational even the most regressive and thoughtless pieces of
medical malpractice reform, such as Virginia's flat caps on
compensatory damages.
14
This entire mode of analysis is, as I just said, premised on the
idea that tort law is merely regulation adjusting the burdens and
benefits of economic life, no different in kind from, say, a regulation
issued by the FDA mandating that drug manufacturers place warning
labels for certain kinds of health risks on their products. To my mind,
however, there is a difference between the constitutional issues raised
by these two classes of law. And again, it is because I think the
conventional theoretical wisdom is wrong to treat tort law as public
law in this sense. Malpractice plaintiffs, like other tort plaintiffs, do
not wear tin badges-they have not been deputized to rein in the
medical profession on behalf of a grateful public. Nor are they filing
claims with FEMA for disaster relief, or under Medicare for medical
benefits. They are suing to redress wrongs done to them. And when
tort is understood as victims' rights law, the tenor of the court's
constitutional analysis should change. Thus, as I have argued at
(excessive) length elsewhere, courts reviewing due process challenges
to defendant-friendly tort reforms ought not to rely on the rational
basis test, but instead should consider: (1) the nature of the interest
13. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
14. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 528-29.
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being protected by the tort cause of action (bodily injury, economic
expectancy, etc.); (2) the nature of the wrongful conduct interfering
with that interest (intentional/callously indifferent, careless) and the
degree of interference with the tort posed by the reform legislation;
and (3) the justification(s) for the reforms.
15
One can surely mock this alternative test. But, as my
economist colleagues like to remind me, the question is: "As compared
to what?" Seen in this light, my multi-factored monstrosity looks a bit
less hideous. Consider by comparison the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
recent decision in the Ferdon case, which struck down Wisconsin's cap
on non-economic damages in malpractice cases on equal protection
grounds.'
6
The plaintiff in that case argued that such caps ought to be
subjected to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clauses of the
state and federal constitutions.' 7  That request was not merely
doctrinally unmotivated. It reveals a basic and deep tension in the
thinking of many who are today favorably disposed to the tort
system.'8 For at least the last fifty years, progressive scholars and
trial lawyers have been trying to have it both ways, endorsing tort law
as a law of wrongs and redress and as a vital piece of regulatory
machinery that delivers safety, brings the powerful to heel, and
responds to interest-group capture of the regulatory state. 19 Cases
like Ferdon reveal the basic instability of this position. If one is going
to take seriously the idea that tort law is about accountability of
wrongdoer to victim, then one has plausible grounds for asking for
more robust judicial oversight of defendant-friendly tort reform
measures than rational basis review, albeit not strict scrutiny.20 But
then one also has to accept that tort law is not a blank regulatory
check that judges and jurors get to fill out based on their conceptions
of desirable public policy outcomes, but instead a body of law with a
more limited and distinctive enterprise in mind. On the other hand,
one can tout the virtues of tort law as a shadow regulatory regime.
But then one has to refrain from appealing to the seemingly
15. Id. at 613-22.
16. Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Wis. 2005).
17. Id. at 456.
18. It goes nearly without saying that there is plenty of inconsistency on the other side of
the 'v.' Consider, for example, conservatives who wield the idea of 'personal responsibility' like a
bludgeon, yet miss no opportunity to trash the one body of law that, more than any other, is all
about holding persons (natural and artificial) responsible to others.
19. See, e.g., THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 1-2
(2001) (arguing that tort law combines the "manifest" function of compensating injury victims
with the "latent" function of regulating businesses to promote the public's interest in safety).
20. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 611-26.
2006] 1081
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:4:1075
compelling notion that the law ought to provide victims of wrongs with
recourse against their wrongdoers. 21 More importantly for present
purposes, one probably has to relinquish any demand for strict
scrutiny of tort reform legislation.22 To do so, on this understanding of
tort, would be akin to demanding strict scrutiny for legislation
reducing fines for OSHA violations.
In my view, therefore, the Ferdon majority wisely declined the
plaintiffs invitation to apply strict scrutiny. Following standard
modern protocol, it opted instead for rational basis analysis. But not
exactly, for its version of rational basis carried sufficient 'bite' that the
damage cap provisions were struck down as irrational.23  This
analysis, like the plaintiffs implausible plea for strict scrutiny, reveals
the strain inherent in any tort theory that simultaneously supposes
that tort law is just a form of regulatory law and that tort law should
enjoy greater immunity from legislative revision than ordinary
regulatory law. According to the majority, it could not consider the
rationality of the cap in isolation, but rather had to gauge it as part of
21. Several conferees wondered aloud why the public might be as receptive as it seems to be
to the modern tort reform movement. The answer may be that it is not, or that it is, but only
because of well-financed disinformation campaigns by industries vulnerable to significant tort
liability and their political allies. Either explanation ignores the fact that there are some
instances in which even fans of tort law should shake their heads in disbelief. For example, how
does one justify the recent Texas Vioxx verdict that awarded a widow who lost her 60-year-old
husband (of one year) $253,000,000.00 in a wrongful death action against Merck for failing to
warn of the risk of heart failure that may accompany the drug? See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Much
Pain, Much Gain: Skeptical Ruminations on the Vioxx Litigation, JURIST, Jan. 23, 2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.eduforumy/2006/01/much-pain-much-gain-skeptical.php. The plaintiff
claimed and received lost income of about $450,000. The jury then awarded her an additional $24
million (!) for her grief and for the loss of companionship that she stands to experience for the
remainder of her life. On top of that, it added more than $200 million in punitive damages. Thus,
by virtue of the verdict, the victim was rendered one of the very richest people in America. True,
the verdict has now been reduced because of Texas's damages caps. And, yes, of course, the case
is a statistical outlier. But so what? There is simply no plausible notion of vindication or redress
that gets one from even a culpable failure on the part of Merck to inform consumers of the health
risks of Vioxx to the idea of this plaintiff being entitled to demand of the company $253 million
for contributing to the death of her husband. Perhaps one can justify such an award as some sort
of bounty-hunter premium or correction for systemic under-litigation, but that is precisely the
sort of public-law justification that members of the American public seem to have a hard time
swallowing.
22. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 580-83 (noting that public-law conceptions of tort helped
pave the way for the application of the rational basis test to due process and equal protection
challenges to tort reform legislation). This is not to say that it is impossible to formulate an
argument for robust scrutiny of tort reform legislation within a public-law conception of tort, just
difficult. Professor Abel, for example, has argued that heightened scrutiny of defendant-friendly
tort reform is warranted because the capture of legislatures by defendant-friendly interest
groups has rendered them, in this area at least, less democratically accountable than courts.
Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 533, 535-46 (1999).
23. Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 460-61 (Wis. 2005).
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the overall edifice of statutory and common law governing malpractice
cases.24 Thus, the court had to assess not just how the cap might
serve some goal or goals, but whether it served the overall goals of the
entire scheme. One goal of the scheme, the majority supposed, is the
delivery of compensation to injury victims on fair terms.25 Surely,
however, it is not fair to deny compensation to the most severely
injured medical malpractice victims, which is what tends to happen by
virtue of the operation of caps. And so, the opinion concludes, because
the cap is not a means of delivering fair compensation it must be
struck down as irrational.
26
The key moves in this analysis-looking to the purposes of the
scheme, as opposed to those of the provision under review; identifying
one purpose that is not served by the caps as opposed to others that
are or might be served by it; treating the caps as part of a self-
contradictory legislative scheme-are, I think, fairly obvious
departures from standard rational basis analysis. At least in this
aspect of its analysis, the Ferdon majority found itself doing back-
flips.2 7 That it had to do so attests to the fact that the court, like most
modern courts and commentators, is operating with an impoverished
tort theory that leaves it unable to capture what is distinctive about
this body of law, and therefore unable to ask a useful set of questions
about the constitutional limits on its reform.
By criticizing the application of strict scrutiny and rational
basis analysis to defendant-friendly tort reforms, I do not mean to
imply that judges and commentators can merely crank the handle on
some alternative test and spit out answers to the question of the
constitutionality of damage caps or tort reforms. In many instances,
these will be hard cases, which is partly why they have attracted a
good deal of scholarly attention. What a test grounded in better tort
theory can offer, however, is a framework that asks questions more
immediately relevant to, and more helpful in assessing, the
constitutionality of reform measures such as caps. In particular, it
does not invite courts that are justifiably worried about the legitimacy
24. Id. at 463-65.
25. Id. at 464.
26. Id. at 466-67.
27. The majority offers a somewhat more promising line of argument when it suggests that
caps on non-economic damages, as applied to certain classes of malpractice claimants who tend
to have minimal economic damages but significant non-economic damages, violate the guarantee
of equal protection of the law. Wisconsin cannot, the majority reasons, hold out tort law as if it is
open to everyone, and then create legal rules that de facto bar certain persons from meaningful
access to that law or meaningful redress. Id. My view is that this intuition is still better
expressed through the idea of a right to a law of redress, as opposed to a right to equal access to
whatever version of tort law courts or legislatures happen to provide.
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of certain tort reform measures to play games with rational basis
analysis. Instead, it asks them to focus on the matters that are really
at hand, including the nature of the tort at issue, the interest(s) the
cause of action aims to vindicate, the type of wrongdoing to which
victims have been enabled to respond, the degree of interference with
the tort cause of action that can be expected to result from the reform,
and the apparent justifications for the reform.
CONCLUSION
The claim of this Essay is that lawyers and scholars involved in
on-the-ground analyses of medical malpractice reform and other tort
reform efforts need to attend to theory along with data. As I have
tried to demonstrate using the examples of under-litigation and
constitutional challenges to tort reform measures, theory inevitably
plays a role in how we construct the data and what sort of inferences
and conclusions we draw from it. The business of tort reform is
important. It is not one that we should undertake without first
having an adequate grasp of what it is that we are reforming.
1084 [Vol. 59:4:1075
